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   2Abstract	  The	  study	  investigated	  the	  influence	  of	  mood	  priming	  and	  how	  the	  influence	  could	  be	  different	  between	  high	  and	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  High	  self-­‐monitors	  would	  exhibit	  more	  of	  a	  change	  in	  mood	  after	  the	  priming	  as	  compared	  to	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  Ninety-­‐seven	  participants	  at	  Union	  College	  completed	  the	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale,	  randomly	  underwent	  either	  positive,	  negative,	  or	  neutral	  mood	  priming,	  and	  then	  reported	  on	  their	  moods.	  	  There	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  found	  between	  the	  moods	  of	  high	  and	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  Low	  self-­‐monitors	  reported	  happier	  feelings	  in	  the	  positive	  mood	  condition	  as	  well	  as	  lower	  moods	  in	  the	  negative	  mood	  condition	  than	  high	  self-­‐monitors.	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   3The	  Differing	  Effects	  of	  Mood	  Priming	  on	  High	  versus	  Low	  Self-­‐Monitors	  	   Priming,	  according	  to	  Bicchieri	  (2006)	  is	  “…an	  increase	  in	  the	  speed	  or	  accuracy	  of	  a	  decision	  that	  occurs	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  prior	  exposure	  to	  some	  of	  the	  information	  in	  the	  decision	  context,	  without	  intention	  or	  task-­‐related	  motivations”	  (pg	  71).	  	  In	  other	  words,	  priming	  involves	  introducing	  participants	  to	  a	  stimulus,	  which	  affects	  their	  reaction	  to	  a	  stimulus	  presented	  afterwards.	  	  Meyer	  &	  Schvaneveldt	  (1971)	  demonstrated	  the	  use	  of	  priming	  with	  a	  lexical	  decision	  task.	  	  Participants	  viewed	  two	  strings	  of	  letters	  simultaneously,	  with	  one	  string	  located	  above	  the	  other,	  and	  responded	  if	  the	  letter	  strings	  were	  words	  or	  not.	  	  The	  priming	  effect	  was	  shown	  when	  participants	  were	  able	  to	  respond	  more	  quickly	  if	  the	  two	  letter	  strings	  were	  semantically	  related	  words	  (i.e.,	  participants	  were	  faster	  to	  answer	  that	  ‘doctor’	  was	  a	  word	  when	  it	  was	  following	  ‘nurse’,	  compared	  to	  ‘north’	  or	  the	  fictional	  word	  ‘nuber’).	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  experiment	  indicated	  that	  priming	  should	  be	  considered	  an	  automatic	  process,	  one	  that	  occurs	  unintentionally.	  	   Priming	  can	  be	  expanded	  to	  influence	  the	  opinions	  of	  participants.	  	  Women	  exposed	  to	  gender-­‐stereotypical	  commercials	  during	  priming	  were	  less	  willing	  to	  take	  a	  leading	  role	  in	  a	  subsequent	  project	  than	  women	  who	  viewed	  neutral	  commercials,	  or	  men	  in	  either	  condition	  (Davies,	  Spencer,	  &	  Steele,	  2005).	  	  Racial	  stereotypes	  have	  also	  been	  shown	  to	  increase	  in	  strength	  during	  priming.	  Wittenbrink,	  Judd,	  and	  Park	  (1997)	  presented	  a	  prime	  of	  words	  associated	  with	  either	  black	  or	  white	  colors	  outside	  of	  conscious	  awareness	  and	  then	  a	  target	  stimulus	  that	  required	  a	  word-­‐nonword	  decision.	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  experiment	  showed	  the	  effect	  of	  prejudice	  because	  the	  black	  primes	  showed	  stronger	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   4facilitation	  to	  negative	  than	  positive	  stereotypic	  traits,	  and	  vice	  versa	  for	  the	  white	  primes.	  	  The	  priming	  demonstrated	  that	  racial	  prejudices	  can	  be	  strengthened	  through	  the	  effect	  of	  priming.	  Mood	  priming	  is	  another	  subcategory	  of	  priming,	  and	  it	  is	  considered	  a	  popular	  and	  valuable	  tool	  used	  in	  many	  various	  psychological	  experiments.	  	  Researchers	  present	  participants	  with	  different	  stimuli	  (ie,	  a	  reading,	  photographs,	  etc)	  in	  order	  to	  target	  a	  certain	  state	  of	  mind.	  	  Bower	  (1981)	  demonstrated	  that	  both	  happy	  and	  sad	  induced	  moods	  boosted	  mood-­‐state-­‐dependent	  memory	  in	  affectively	  congruent	  situations.	  	  The	  experiment	  showed	  that	  mood	  induced	  participants	  had	  higher	  memory	  recall	  for	  similarly	  emotional	  childhood	  events	  than	  participants	  in	  a	  neutral	  mood.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  participants	  who	  experienced	  induced	  happiness	  had	  an	  easier	  time	  recalling	  happy	  memories	  from	  childhood	  than	  the	  participants	  who	  did	  not	  have	  an	  induced	  mood.	  	  The	  participants	  demonstrated	  emotional	  congruence	  between	  the	  induced	  mood	  and	  a	  naturally	  occurring	  mood.	  	  Data	  from	  the	  first	  two	  studies	  done	  by	  Mayer,	  Gaschke,	  Braverman,	  &	  Evans	  (1992)	  similarly	  suggested	  that	  laboratory	  induced	  moods	  have	  similar	  effects	  to	  natural	  moods	  in	  a	  college	  student	  population.	  	  An	  induced	  mood	  therefore	  should	  have	  the	  same	  impact	  as	  a	  naturally	  occurring	  mood.	  The	  induced	  mood	  of	  participants	  can	  have	  a	  significant	  impact	  upon	  their	  behavior,	  performance,	  and	  feelings.	  	  Fisher	  &	  Marrow	  (1934)	  showed	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  negative	  mood	  condition	  had	  slower	  reaction	  times	  in	  a	  free	  association	  task.	  	  Participants	  were	  submitted	  to	  a	  hypnosis	  procedure	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  mood	  and	  then	  completed	  a	  timed	  association	  task	  with	  words	  that	  were	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   5either	  without	  strong	  mood	  associations,	  pleasant,	  unpredictable,	  or	  unpleasant.	  	  The	  times	  were	  then	  compared	  across	  the	  different	  induced	  mood	  conditions.	  	  Data	  from	  the	  timed	  task	  showed	  that	  on	  average,	  participants	  in	  the	  negative	  mood	  condition	  responded	  more	  slowly	  than	  the	  positive	  mood	  condition	  participants	  or	  those	  in	  the	  neutral	  while	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  positive	  condition	  were	  faster	  than	  those	  in	  the	  neutral.	  	  The	  induced	  negative	  mood	  led	  to	  a	  feeling	  of	  lethargy	  in	  the	  participants	  such	  that	  they	  were	  not	  able	  to	  perform	  the	  task	  as	  quickly	  as	  those	  experiencing	  a	  positive	  mood.	  	  	  Further	  experimentation	  has	  shown	  that	  participants	  who	  experienced	  induced	  moods	  exhibited	  altered	  behaviors.	  	  Matheny	  &	  Blue	  (1977)	  had	  three	  different	  conditions	  for	  participants,	  including	  elation,	  depression,	  or	  neutrality.	  	  In	  a	  comparison	  between	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐test	  scores	  on	  timed	  activities,	  elation-­‐condition	  participants	  had	  higher	  reaction	  times	  than	  those	  in	  either	  the	  neutral	  or	  depression	  conditions.	  Overall,	  participants	  in	  the	  depression	  condition	  reported	  that	  the	  induced	  mood	  procedure	  hurt	  their	  writing	  speed,	  decision	  time,	  and	  reaction	  time,	  while	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  positive	  mood	  condition	  found	  the	  treatment	  to	  be	  helpful.	  Mentally,	  participants	  who	  experience	  mood	  induction	  reported	  changes	  in	  their	  locus	  of	  control	  (Natale,	  1978).	  	  According	  to	  the	  research,	  participants	  completed	  the	  Locus	  of	  Control	  Scale,	  went	  through	  a	  mood	  induction	  procedure,	  and	  then	  filled	  the	  scale	  out	  a	  second	  time.	  	  	  The	  pre-­‐post	  test	  changes	  showed	  that	  elation	  led	  to	  a	  higher	  sense	  of	  internality,	  depression	  to	  a	  higher	  sense	  of	  externality,	  and	  no	  change	  in	  the	  neutral	  condition.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  participants	  in	  a	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   6negative	  mood	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  blame	  the	  environment	  or	  other	  outside	  factors	  for	  influencing	  their	  lives,	  rather	  than	  accepting	  the	  responsibility.	  	   One	  of	  the	  most	  well	  established	  methods	  intended	  to	  induce	  different	  mood	  states	  comes	  from	  Velten	  (1967,	  1968).	  	  In	  the	  experiment,	  100	  undergraduate	  students	  completed	  the	  Harvard	  Group	  Scale	  of	  Hypnotic	  Susceptibility	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  baseline	  of	  suggestibility.	  	  The	  participants	  were	  then	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  five	  conditions	  including	  control,	  positive	  mood,	  negative	  mood,	  simulated	  elation,	  and	  simulated	  depression.	  	  The	  participants	  in	  the	  elation	  or	  depression	  conditions	  viewed	  sixty	  statements	  intended	  to	  produce	  an	  altered	  mood,	  while	  those	  in	  the	  neutral	  condition	  simply	  read	  sixty	  facts.	  	  After	  completing	  the	  mood	  induction,	  participants	  completed	  a	  variety	  of	  timed	  tasks	  in	  order	  to	  monitor	  their	  reaction	  time.	  	  Results	  from	  the	  experiment	  indicated	  that	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  elated	  condition	  performed	  tasks	  more	  quickly	  than	  both	  the	  neutral	  and	  depression	  conditions,	  and	  then	  neutral	  condition	  outperformed	  the	  depression	  condition.	  	  Similar	  results	  were	  found	  in	  terms	  of	  decision	  time,	  and	  word	  association	  reaction	  time.	  	  The	  depression	  condition	  participants	  were	  slowed	  down	  by	  the	  sad	  thoughts	  while	  those	  in	  the	  elation	  condition	  had	  improved	  work	  ethic	  and	  could	  complete	  tasks	  at	  a	  more	  efficient	  pace.	  	  The	  results	  showed	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  inducted	  mood	  states.	  	   Past	  research	  (Goritz	  &	  Moser,	  2006)	  has	  shown	  that	  mood	  induction	  is	  less	  effective	  online	  rather	  than	  in	  person	  regardless	  of	  type	  of	  induction	  utilized.	  	  	  The	  three	  types	  of	  mood	  priming	  included	  the	  Velten	  technique,	  photographs,	  and	  autobiographical	  recall,	  with	  comparable	  results	  across	  the	  different	  conditions.	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   7Data	  revealed	  that	  while	  participants	  in	  the	  negative	  mood	  condition	  had	  an	  overall	  lower	  mood	  than	  those	  in	  the	  control	  group,	  there	  was	  not	  a	  significant	  mood	  difference	  between	  those	  in	  the	  control	  group	  and	  those	  in	  the	  positive	  mood	  condition.	  	  Several	  factors	  may	  account	  for	  the	  difference	  but	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  online	  version	  is	  simply	  not	  as	  refined	  as	  the	  practiced	  paper	  method.	  	  While	  negative	  mood	  could	  be	  successfully	  induced	  in	  the	  online	  experiment,	  positive	  feelings	  were	  not	  reliably	  recorded.	  However,	  Verheyen	  &	  Goritz	  (2009)	  also	  tested	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  mood-­‐induction	  in	  an	  online	  environment.	  	  	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  four	  different	  conditions.	  	  The	  experiment	  included	  eight	  different	  groups	  of	  participants	  within	  the	  four	  different	  conditions.	  	  Two	  groups	  were	  control,	  two	  were	  aimed	  at	  inducing	  a	  negative	  mood,	  and	  the	  other	  four	  were	  geared	  towards	  inducing	  a	  positive	  mood.	  	  The	  increased	  number	  of	  participants	  in	  the	  positive	  conditions	  allowed	  the	  researcher	  to	  try	  a	  greater	  variety	  of	  positive	  mood	  inducing	  techniques.	  	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  participants	  in	  the	  positive	  condition	  reported	  higher	  moods	  were	  that	  were	  significantly	  different	  from	  the	  neutral	  condition,	  though	  not	  as	  different	  as	  between	  the	  neutral	  and	  negative	  conditions.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  positive	  moods	  could	  be	  induced	  through	  online	  techniques,	  but	  the	  positive	  feelings	  were	  not	  as	  strongly	  different	  from	  neutral	  as	  the	  negative	  feelings.	  Based	  upon	  the	  past	  research,	  mood-­‐induction	  has	  shown	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  technique	  for	  altering	  the	  emotional	  mindset	  of	  a	  participant.	  	  The	  effect	  of	  induction	  is	  true	  for	  all,	  but	  it	  may	  be	  more	  likely	  or	  more	  effective	  for	  some	  participants	  than	  for	  others	  based	  upon	  different	  personality	  factors.	  	  One	  factor	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   8potentially	  influencing	  the	  mood	  priming	  could	  be	  self-­‐monitoring.	  	  Self-­‐monitoring	  is	  the	  practice	  by	  which	  people	  may	  observe	  and	  control	  their	  expressive	  behaviors	  and	  social	  presentation	  (Snyder,	  1974).	  	  Expressive	  control	  of	  behavior	  is	  commonly	  used	  in	  everyday	  social	  interactions	  as	  a	  way	  to	  convey	  internal	  status	  with	  nonverbal	  cues,	  including	  facial	  expressions,	  gesticulations,	  and	  posture.	  	  The	  famed	  actor	  Sir	  Tyrone	  Guthrie	  (Forsyth,	  1976)	  believed	  that	  such	  expressions	  facilitated	  communication;	  that	  acting	  was	  simply	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  control.	  	  As	  such,	  expressive	  control	  can	  be	  used	  to	  not	  only	  boost	  social	  actions,	  but	  also	  to	  hinder	  them	  through	  deceit	  and	  lying.	  	   Past	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  different	  people	  have	  different	  levels	  of	  expressive	  control	  (Riggio	  &	  Friedman,	  1982;	  Siegman	  &	  Reynolds,	  1983).	  	  Logically,	  it	  makes	  sense	  that	  some	  people	  would	  naturally	  make	  better	  actors	  than	  others,	  simply	  because	  they	  have	  higher	  control	  over	  their	  expressions.	  	  One	  theory	  to	  explain	  the	  individual	  differences	  in	  levels	  of	  expressive	  control	  is	  Snyder’s	  theory	  of	  self-­‐monitoring.	  	  Self-­‐monitoring	  concerns	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  people	  purposefully	  develop	  a	  public	  façade	  and	  the	  consequences	  of	  that	  decision	  (Gangestad	  &	  Snyder,	  1991:	  Snyder,	  1974,	  1987).	  	  Snyder	  believed	  that	  stable	  individual	  differences	  exist	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  individuals	  routinely	  monitor	  their	  impressions	  to	  others.	  	  He	  believed	  that	  some	  people,	  known	  as	  high	  self-­‐monitors,	  are	  those	  more	  concerned	  with	  expressive	  self-­‐presentation.	  	  Other	  people,	  those	  known	  as	  low	  self-­‐monitors,	  do	  not	  engage	  in	  expressive	  control.	  Snyder	  (1974)	  developed	  a	  continuum	  scale	  to	  measure	  self-­‐monitoring.	  	  In	  the	  study,	  192	  Stanford	  University	  undergraduates	  answered	  forty-­‐one	  true/false	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   9self-­‐descriptive	  statements.	  	  The	  statements	  were	  concerned	  with	  five	  different	  items,	  including	  concern	  regarding	  social	  appropriateness	  of	  one’s	  appearance,	  attention	  paid	  to	  social	  comparison	  cues,	  the	  ability	  to	  control	  or	  modify	  expressive	  behavior,	  when	  that	  ability	  is	  applicable,	  and	  the	  cross-­‐situational	  consistency	  of	  expressive	  behavior.	  	  Based	  upon	  that	  study,	  sixteen	  of	  the	  forty-­‐one	  tested	  statements	  were	  removed	  because	  they	  were	  not	  substantially	  supported	  by	  the	  data.	  	  The	  original	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale	  therefore	  consisted	  of	  the	  remaining	  twenty-­‐five	  true/false	  items	  that	  demonstrated	  validity.	  	  Follow-­‐up	  studies	  were	  conducted	  with	  different	  groups	  of	  participants	  in	  order	  to	  validate	  the	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale.	  	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  theater	  actors	  scored	  higher	  than	  and	  psychiatric	  ward	  patients	  scored	  lower	  than	  university	  students,	  consistent	  with	  the	  self-­‐monitoring	  hypothesis.	  The	  original	  twenty-­‐five	  statement	  scale	  was	  later	  modified	  to	  only	  include	  eighteen	  items	  (Snyder,	  1987).	  	  The	  removal	  of	  seven	  items	  increased	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale	  without	  diminishing	  from	  its	  established	  intrinsic	  validity.	  	  Deleted	  items	  included	  those	  such	  as	  I	  sometimes	  appear	  to	  others	  to	  be	  
experiencing	  deeper	  emotions	  than	  I	  actually	  am	  and	  In	  order	  to	  get	  along	  and	  be	  
liked,	  I	  tend	  to	  be	  what	  other	  people	  expect	  me	  to	  be	  rather	  than	  anything	  else.	  	  The	  statements	  removed	  from	  the	  scale	  consisted	  of	  those	  that	  did	  not	  statistically	  discriminate	  well	  between	  the	  more	  moderately	  scoring	  high	  and	  low	  self-­‐monitors,	  such	  that	  the	  revised	  scale	  demonstrated	  a	  higher	  internal	  consistency	  (coefficient	  alpha	  =	  .70)	  than	  that	  of	  the	  original	  (.66).	  	  On	  the	  eighteen	  item	  scale,	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  agree	  with	  statements	  such	  as	  I	  have	  trouble	  changing	  my	  behavior	  to	  suit	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different	  people	  and	  different	  situations	  and	  I	  would	  not	  change	  my	  opinion	  (or	  the	  
way	  I	  do	  things)	  in	  order	  to	  please	  people	  or	  win	  their	  favor	  	  (Snyder,	  1974,	  1987).	  	  High	  self-­‐monitors	  are	  likely	  to	  agree	  with	  statements	  such	  as	  I	  would	  probably	  
make	  a	  good	  actor	  and/or	  In	  different	  situations	  and	  with	  different	  people,	  I	  often	  act	  
like	  very	  different	  persons	  (Snyder,	  1974,	  1987).	  	  	  Participants	  with	  a	  score	  greater	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  eleven	  on	  the	  eighteen-­‐item	  scale	  are	  considered	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  and	  those	  scoring	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  ten	  are	  considered	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  (Snyder,	  1987).	  	  Gangestad	  &	  Snyder	  (1985)	  estimated	  that	  college	  students	  with	  a	  score	  of	  eleven	  or	  higher	  had	  over	  a	  .5	  probability	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  category	  of	  high	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  A	  purer	  sample	  of	  data	  would	  consist	  of	  those	  found	  only	  in	  the	  upper	  and	  low	  quartiles	  (participants	  scoring	  thirteen	  and	  over	  for	  high	  self-­‐monitors;	  seven	  and	  below	  for	  low	  self-­‐monitors).	  	   Individual	  differences	  in	  self-­‐monitoring	  are	  measured	  by	  the	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale,	  first	  developed	  by	  Snyder	  in	  1974.	  	  High	  self-­‐monitors	  are	  those	  likely	  to	  exhibit	  ‘chameleon’	  behaviors	  –	  they	  have	  a	  heightened	  ability	  to	  perceive	  social	  clues	  and	  react	  correspondingly.	  	  They	  may	  have	  different	  groups	  of	  friends	  in	  different	  contexts,	  and	  may	  themselves	  appear	  to	  be	  different	  persons	  in	  varied	  settings	  (Snyder,	  1974).	  	  The	  behavior	  could	  stem	  from	  a	  desire	  to	  behave	  in	  a	  manner	  appropriate	  to	  the	  current	  social	  situation.	  	  High	  self-­‐monitors	  are	  willing,	  and	  able,	  to	  project	  an	  image	  to	  impress	  or	  blend	  in	  with	  others.	  	  As	  such,	  the	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  continually	  regulate	  the	  social	  environment	  and	  therefore	  engage	  in	  a	  high	  level	  of	  expressive	  control.	  	  Low	  self-­‐monitors,	  in	  contrast,	  do	  not	  exhibit	  the	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   11same	  urge	  to	  demonstrate	  situationally	  appropriate	  behaviors.	  	  Rather,	  they	  express	  their	  own	  inner	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  with	  their	  behaviors.	  Earlier	  research	  suggests	  that	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  are	  more	  influenced	  than	  lows	  by	  environmental	  and	  external	  cues.	  	  Snyder	  &	  Monson	  (1975)	  studied	  participants	  in	  either	  a	  public	  or	  private	  discussion	  condition	  where	  the	  public	  condition	  was	  monitored	  with	  a	  video	  camera,	  microphone,	  and	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror	  while	  the	  private	  condition	  had	  only	  a	  table	  and	  chairs.	  	  Participants	  in	  the	  public	  condition	  were	  told	  that	  the	  videotaped	  conversation	  would	  be	  used	  as	  an	  in-­‐class	  example.	  	  All	  participants	  obtained	  a	  booklet	  of	  four	  hypothetical	  choice	  situations	  to	  be	  discussed	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  group	  and	  they	  were	  specifically	  told	  that	  they	  did	  not	  have	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus.	  	  It	  was	  predicted	  that	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  would	  conform	  to	  the	  majority	  opinion	  more	  in	  the	  private	  condition	  than	  in	  the	  public	  one	  because	  they	  would	  have	  a	  more	  immediate	  reference	  group	  available.	  	  In	  close	  company,	  the	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  would	  feel	  more	  pressure	  to	  adhere	  to	  the	  norm	  than	  amongst	  larger	  crowd.	  	  Results	  were	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis;	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  were	  consistent	  across	  the	  conditions	  while	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  conformed	  more	  in	  the	  private	  than	  public	  condition.	  Klein,	  Snyder,	  and	  Livingston	  (2004)	  studied	  the	  relationship	  between	  personality	  and	  situational	  adaptability	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  moderating	  role	  of	  an	  audience	  on	  prejudice.	  	  The	  researchers	  hypothesized	  that	  “individual	  differences	  in	  sensitivity	  to	  situational	  cues,	  or	  concerns	  with	  social	  appropriateness”	  would	  be	  a	  strong	  moderator	  of	  expressing	  prejudice	  (Klein,	  Snyder,	  &	  Livingston,	  2004,	  pg	  301).	  	  Participants	  completed	  the	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale	  as	  well	  as	  a	  scale	  measuring	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   12their	  levels	  of	  prejudice	  towards	  homosexuals.	  	  Several	  weeks	  later,	  the	  same	  participants	  returned	  to	  take	  part	  in	  a	  seemingly	  unrelated	  study.	  	  The	  participants	  were	  told	  to	  fill	  out	  a	  questionnaire	  on	  the	  couples,	  and	  that	  they	  would	  be	  discussing	  their	  answers	  afterwards	  with	  either	  a	  tolerant,	  intolerant,	  or	  no	  audience.	  	  The	  results	  showed	  that	  overall,	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  more	  frequently	  expressed	  prejudice	  when	  expecting	  an	  intolerant	  or	  no	  audience,	  and	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  express	  prejudice	  before	  a	  tolerant	  audience	  compared	  to	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  Differing	  levels	  of	  self-­‐monitoring	  also	  plays	  a	  role	  in	  adolescents’	  susceptibility	  to	  peer	  pressure.	  	  A	  longitudinal	  study	  (Perrine	  &	  Aloise-­‐Young,	  2004)	  administered	  the	  junior	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale,	  a	  self	  reported	  history	  of	  smoking	  habits,	  and	  measures	  of	  both	  active	  and	  passive	  peer	  pressure	  to	  the	  participants.	  	  A	  follow	  up	  survey	  of	  the	  participants	  found	  that	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  who	  considered	  smoking	  to	  be	  a	  normative	  behavior	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  become	  smokers	  than	  those	  who	  did	  not	  find	  it	  a	  normative	  behavior.	  	  The	  decision	  to	  become	  a	  smoker	  was	  not	  dependent	  upon	  normative	  beliefs	  for	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  High	  self-­‐monitors	  reported	  a	  higher	  likelihood	  to	  submit	  to	  peer	  pressure	  when	  they	  considered	  smoking	  to	  be	  a	  normal	  activity	  than	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  The	  reported	  scores	  from	  the	  study	  indicated	  that	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  were	  more	  vulnerable	  than	  lows	  to	  the	  influences	  of	  their	  peers.	  High	  self-­‐monitors	  are	  also	  less	  likely	  to	  demonstrate	  high	  attitude-­‐behavior	  consistency	  than	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  Snyder	  &	  Swann	  (1976)	  monitored	  how	  participants	  formed	  judgments	  of	  liability	  in	  court	  cases.	  	  The	  participants	  reported	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  their	  attitudes	  about	  affirmative	  action	  two	  weeks	  before	  the	  experiment	  was	  conducted.	  	  During	  the	  study,	  participants	  read	  a	  case	  and	  then	  recorded	  a	  verdict	  as	  a	  simulated	  juror.	  	  Results	  showed	  that	  the	  attitudes	  reported	  by	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  in	  the	  preexperimental	  session	  were	  not	  good	  indicators	  of	  their	  verdicts.	  	  The	  results	  presumably	  differ	  because	  the	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  modified	  their	  statement	  to	  fit	  in	  with	  the	  immediate	  social	  situation.	  	  In	  contrast,	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  indicated	  verdicts	  that	  were	  consistent	  with	  their	  reported	  beliefs.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  were	  less	  affected	  by	  the	  environmental	  cues	  involved	  in	  the	  simulation	  than	  the	  high	  self-­‐monitors.	  Based	  upon	  the	  research	  of	  mood	  priming	  and	  self-­‐monitoring,	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  may	  be	  less	  influenced	  by	  the	  mood	  induction	  when	  compared	  to	  high	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  Since	  mood	  priming	  relies	  upon	  participants	  picking	  up	  on	  social	  clues	  and	  reacting	  accordingly,	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  receptive	  to	  adapting	  to	  the	  proposed	  emotional	  climate	  while	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  should	  be	  more	  resistant	  to	  internal	  mood	  shifts	  based	  on	  changes	  in	  the	  external	  environment.	  	  It	  is	  hypothesized	  that	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  will	  experience	  a	  greater	  amount	  of	  emotional	  change	  based	  on	  mood	  induction	  in	  comparison	  to	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  Method	  
Participants	  	   Ninety-­‐seven	  undergraduate	  students	  at	  a	  private	  college	  participated	  in	  the	  experiment	  in	  exchange	  for	  class	  credit	  or	  cash.	  	  	  Four	  participants	  were	  eliminated	  from	  the	  data	  sample	  for	  completing	  the	  experiment	  incorrectly.	  	  The	  sample	  included	  67	  females	  and	  26	  males.	  	  The	  average	  age	  of	  the	  participants	  was	  19.59	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   14years.	  	  They	  voluntarily	  chose	  to	  complete	  the	  experiment	  through	  Union	  College.	  	  Participants	  signed	  up	  online	  through	  www.freud.union.edu.	  	  
Materials	  and	  procedure	  	   The	  study	  consisted	  of	  a	  combination	  of	  a	  handwritten	  and	  computerized	  assignment.	  	  Deception	  was	  used	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  the	  study	  in	  order	  to	  reduce	  the	  possibility	  of	  participants	  responding	  inaccurately.	  	  Participants	  were	  informed	  that	  the	  experiment	  would	  be	  testing	  differing	  factors	  on	  memory	  capabilities	  to	  disguise	  the	  true	  hypothesis.	  	  There	  were	  three	  possible	  conditions;	  a	  control	  group	  that	  read	  a	  neutral	  mood	  induction,	  a	  positive	  mood	  induction,	  and	  a	  negative	  mood	  induction	  for	  both	  high	  and	  low	  self-­‐monitors,	  creating	  a	  total	  of	  six	  different	  groups.	  	  Participants	  were	  assigned	  randomly	  to	  one	  of	  the	  conditions	  based	  upon	  their	  Freud	  timeslot.	  	  The	  experiment	  took	  one	  half-­‐hour	  to	  complete	  and	  was	  always	  run	  in	  three	  consecutive	  blocks.	  	  As	  such,	  they	  had	  an	  equal	  chance	  of	  being	  assigned	  to	  any	  of	  the	  three	  conditions.	  	  Each	  participant	  filled	  out	  the	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale	  developed	  by	  Snyder	  and	  Gangestad	  (1986).	  	  The	  scale	  included	  the	  items	  listed	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  After	  completing	  the	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale,	  participants	  began	  the	  computerized	  section	  of	  the	  study.	  	  The	  next	  part	  of	  the	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  the	  mood	  priming,	  developed	  from	  the	  Mood	  Induction	  Procedure	  by	  Velten	  (1967).	  	  All	  participants	  saw	  the	  following	  instructions:	  “A	  series	  of	  statements	  will	  appear	  onscreen.	  	  I	  will	  take	  the	  time	  to	  read	  the	  statement	  in	  my	  head,	  and	  then	  I	  will	  read	  it	  out	  loud	  once.	  	  I	  will	  then	  go	  over	  the	  statement	  again	  and	  again	  in	  my	  head	  and	  concentrate	  my	  full	  attention	  on	  it.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  will	  always	  attempt	  to	  respond	  to	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   15the	  feeling	  suggested	  by	  each	  statement.	  	  I	  am	  letting	  myself	  be	  receptive	  to	  these	  feelings.”	  	   Each	  item	  for	  each	  condition	  came	  up	  on	  screen	  for	  fifteen	  seconds.	  	  After	  a	  brief	  pause,	  the	  next	  item	  appeared.	  	  During	  this	  time,	  participants	  had	  no	  control	  over	  the	  progression	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  The	  positive,	  negative,	  and	  neutral	  mood	  induction	  statements	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendices	  B,	  C,	  and	  D,	  respectively.	  Next,	  the	  participants	  presented	  with	  a	  list	  of	  emotional	  words.	  Participants	  indicated	  to	  what	  extent	  they	  were	  currently	  feeling	  each	  emotion	  on	  a	  1	  –	  5	  item	  scale	  where	  1	  indicates	  very	  slightly	  or	  not	  at	  all	  and	  5	  indicates	  extremely.	  	  The	  positive	  and	  negative	  affect	  scale	  (PANAS)	  used	  in	  the	  study	  was	  based	  off	  of	  Watson	  &	  Clark	  (1988).	  	  A	  list	  of	  emotion	  words	  used	  in	  the	  experiment	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  E.	  	  	  Participants	  will	  finally	  be	  asked	  to	  write	  down	  as	  many	  of	  the	  mood	  statements	  as	  they	  can	  recall,	  as	  per	  the	  deception.	  	  Upon	  completion	  of	  the	  memory	  task,	  participants	  were	  debriefed	  on	  the	  study.	  Results	  	   	   The	  self-­‐monitoring	  scale	  was	  scored	  in	  accordance	  the	  description	  established	  by	  Snyder	  and	  Gangestand	  (1986).	  	  If	  the	  answer	  of	  the	  participant	  matched	  the	  key’s	  answer	  (found	  in	  Appendix	  A),	  then	  one	  point	  was	  awarded.	  	  If	  the	  answer	  was	  different,	  then	  the	  participant	  did	  not	  receive	  a	  point	  on	  the	  item.	  	  The	  points	  were	  added	  up	  for	  all	  eighteen	  items.	  	  As	  per	  the	  recommdentations	  of	  Snyder	  &	  Gangestad	  (1986),	  those	  with	  a	  score	  of	  eleven	  or	  higher	  were	  classified	  as	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  high	  self-­‐monitor	  while	  those	  with	  ten	  or	  fewer	  points	  were	  considered	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	   To	  determine	  the	  mood	  of	  each	  participant,	  the	  negative	  emotion	  words	  on	  the	  PANAS	  scale	  were	  first	  negatively	  scored.	  	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  participant	  had	  answered	  “Irritable”	  with	  a	  4,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  reverse	  scored	  as	  a	  -­4.	  	  The	  positive	  affect	  was	  calculated	  by	  adding	  together	  the	  scores	  on	  each	  of	  the	  positive	  words	  and	  the	  negative	  affect	  by	  adding	  together	  all	  of	  the	  negative	  word	  scores.	  	  The	  overall	  mood	  score	  was	  calculated	  by	  adding	  together	  the	  positive	  affect	  and	  the	  negative	  affect	  (i.e.	  +30	  +	  -­‐25	  =	  5).	  	  The	  average	  mood	  scores	  for	  participants	  in	  each	  condition	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  Higher	  scores	  on	  this	  index	  indicate	  more	  positive	  moods.	  In	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  mood	  priming	  on	  high	  and	  low	  self-­‐monitors,	  overall	  mood	  scores	  were	  submitted	  to	  a	  2	  (High	  and	  Low	  Self-­‐Monitors)	  x	  3	  (Positive,	  Negative,	  or	  Neutral	  Prime	  Condition)	  ANOVA.	  	  This	  analysis	  revealed	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  for	  condition,	  F(2,87)	  =	  19.5,	  p	  =	  0.00	  and	  a	  significant	  self-­‐monitoring	  x	  mood	  priming	  interaction,	  F(2,	  87)	  =	  3.83,	  p	  =	  .025.	  	  The	  main	  effect	  for	  self-­‐monitoring	  was	  not	  significant,	  F(1,87)	  =	  0,	  p	  >	  .05.	  Follow	  up	  tests	  on	  the	  condition	  main	  effect	  indicated	  that	  the	  mood	  of	  those	  in	  the	  Positive	  Prime	  condition	  was	  significantly	  more	  positive	  than	  the	  mood	  of	  those	  in	  the	  Negative	  Prime	  Condition,	  t(87)	  =	  6.65,	  p	  <	  .05.	  	  Similarly,	  participant	  mood	  was	  significantly	  more	  positive	  in	  the	  Positive	  Prime	  condition	  than	  in	  the	  Neutral	  Condition,	  t(87)	  =	  4.21,	  p	  <	  .05,	  and	  the	  mood	  of	  those	  in	  the	  Negative	  Prime	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   17condition	  was	  marginally	  less	  positive	  than	  the	  mood	  of	  those	  in	  the	  Neutral	  Condition,	  t(87)	  =	  -­‐1.82,	  p	  =	  .07.	  A	  breakdown	  of	  the	  significant	  interaction	  indicated	  that,	  in	  the	  Positive	  Prime	  condition,	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  reported	  being	  in	  a	  significantly	  more	  positive	  
mood	  than	  did	  high	  self-­‐monitors,	  t(87)	  =	  2.02,	  p	  =	  .046.	  	  Conversely,	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  in	  the	  Negative	  Prime	  condition	  reported	  being	  in	  a	  more	  negative	  mood	  than	  did	  high	  self-­‐monitors,	  although	  this	  effect	  did	  not	  quite	  reach	  statistical	  significance,	  t(87)	  =	  -­‐1.88,	  p	  =	  .06.	  	  A	  significant	  difference	  did	  not	  exist	  between	  High	  and	  Low	  self-­‐monitors	  in	  the	  Neutral	  Condition	  t(87)	  =	  -­‐.14,	  p	  =	  .89.	  Discussion	  	   The	  results	  indicate	  that	  overall,	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  were	  more	  influenced	  by	  the	  mood	  induction	  than	  the	  high	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  While	  the	  data	  failed	  to	  support	  the	  original	  hypothesis,	  significant	  results	  were	  found	  between	  differing	  levels	  of	  self-­‐monitoring.	  	   The	  results	  could	  be	  due	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  between	  the	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  Self-­‐awareness	  is	  a	  component	  of	  self-­‐consciousness	  that	  describes	  the	  individual’s	  understanding	  of	  his	  or	  her	  own	  internalized	  state	  (Wheeler,	  Morrison,	  DeMarree,	  &	  Petty,	  2007).	  	  As	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  are	  more	  in	  touch	  with	  their	  internalized	  states	  than	  high	  self-­‐monitors,	  they	  may	  have	  been	  able	  to	  more	  accurately	  identify	  the	  different	  feelings	  from	  the	  mood	  induction.	  	  The	  higher	  level	  of	  self-­‐awareness	  from	  the	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  would	  explain	  the	  wider	  range	  of	  scores	  as	  they	  could	  understand	  and	  interpret	  their	  inner	  status.	  	  	  High	  self-­‐
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   18monitors	  may	  have	  had	  a	  smaller	  range	  of	  responses	  because	  they	  were	  less	  self-­‐aware	  and	  therefore	  could	  not	  report	  their	  emotions	  as	  strongly.	  Searle	  (1998)	  recognized	  that	  consciousness,	  or	  self-­‐awareness,	  could	  be	  an	  intentional	  decision.	  	  In	  that	  explanation,	  the	  mood	  induction	  used	  in	  the	  experiment	  could	  have	  triggered	  a	  vague	  emotional	  response	  in	  the	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  Such	  feelings	  would	  have	  been	  inconsistent	  with	  their	  prior	  internal	  state	  and	  thus	  caused	  a	  disturbance.	  	  As	  the	  induced	  mood	  feelings	  were	  brought	  into	  consciousness,	  the	  brains	  of	  the	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  may	  made	  the	  commitment	  to	  reinforce	  the	  internal	  state	  with	  beliefs	  and	  memories	  that	  further	  enhanced	  the	  mood	  priming.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  consciousness	  of	  the	  environmentally	  induced	  feelings	  led	  the	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  to	  reinforce	  the	  feelings	  based	  upon	  internalized	  personal	  experiences.	  	  In	  contrast,	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  would	  have	  been	  more	  accepting	  of	  the	  cues	  from	  the	  environment	  and	  not	  felt	  the	  impulse	  to	  intentionally	  justify	  the	  emotions.	  Past	  research	  supports	  the	  theory	  that	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  have	  higher	  levels	  of	  private	  self-­‐awareness	  than	  high	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  Low	  self-­‐monitors,	  when	  focused	  on	  their	  own	  private	  self,	  had	  better	  access	  to	  their	  own	  self-­‐awareness	  (Webb,	  Marsh,	  Schneiderman,	  &	  Davis,	  1989).	  	  High	  self-­‐monitors	  performed	  better	  when	  focused	  upon	  a	  public	  self-­‐awareness.	  	  The	  data	  may	  have	  suggested	  that	  high	  self-­‐monitors	  would	  experience	  more	  mood	  induction	  in	  a	  one-­‐on-­‐one	  setting	  while	  the	  low	  self-­‐monitors	  were	  able	  to	  respond	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  internalized	  states	  in	  the	  private	  computerized	  cubicles.	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  were	  several	  other	  smaller	  discrepancies	  within	  the	  current	  experiment.	  	  Data	  were	  inconsistent	  with	  past	  research	  regarding	  the	  online	  effect	  of	  mood	  induction.	  	  In	  the	  original	  experiment,	  positive	  mood	  was	  not	  statistically	  significant	  from	  neutral	  mood,	  but	  it	  was	  possible	  to	  successfully	  induce	  a	  negative	  mood	  (Goritz	  &	  Moser,	  2006).	  	  	  The	  current	  research	  supported	  a	  significant	  positive	  mood	  induction	  compared	  to	  the	  neutral	  and	  negative	  conditions	  but	  not	  a	  difference	  between	  the	  negative	  and	  neutral.	  	  It	  could	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  mood	  induction	  was	  not	  truly	  considered	  online,	  as	  there	  was	  temporary	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interaction	  between	  the	  participants	  and	  the	  researcher.	  	  A	  second	  explanation	  for	  the	  results	  could	  be	  that	  the	  neutral	  condition	  had	  an	  overall	  more	  positive	  mood	  than	  negative	  (M	  =	  5.75),	  indicating	  that	  the	  participants	  were	  generally	  happier	  people.	  	  	  The	  elevated	  average	  could	  indicate	  that	  the	  neutral	  mood	  priming	  was	  ineffective	  as	  a	  controlled	  baseline	  measure	  of	  mood.	  	   Similarly,	  there	  is	  not	  research	  to	  support	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  shortened	  version	  of	  the	  Velten	  mood	  induction	  technique	  was	  equal	  across	  the	  conditions.	  	  For	  the	  large	  number	  of	  participants	  used	  in	  the	  experiment,	  it	  was	  not	  a	  practical	  option	  to	  test	  individually	  in	  a	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  setting.	  	  A	  baseline	  study	  should	  be	  completed	  to	  study	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  abbreviated	  mood	  induction	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  results	  were	  due	  to	  equal	  priming.	  	  In	  a	  future	  replication	  of	  the	  experiment,	  the	  full	  Velten	  procedure	  should	  be	  run	  on	  the	  participants.	  	  While	  it	  would	  increase	  the	  length	  of	  the	  experiment,	  it	  would	  provide	  a	  more	  accurate	  view	  of	  the	  induction.	  	   The	  current	  experiment	  could	  also	  be	  changed	  to	  include	  a	  task	  before	  the	  induction	  intended	  to	  measure	  mood.	  	  For	  example,	  research	  shows	  that	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   20participants	  may	  perform	  more	  poorly	  on	  a	  Stoop	  test	  when	  they	  are	  in	  a	  positive	  mood	  (Phillips,	  Bull,	  Adams,	  &	  Fraser,	  2002).	  	  Inclusion	  of	  the	  task	  before	  the	  Velten	  mood	  induction	  would	  give	  a	  better	  picture	  of	  change	  in	  mood	  without	  the	  participants	  developing	  response	  bias.	  	  The	  mood	  analysis	  task	  would	  provide	  a	  baseline	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  induction	  for	  both	  high	  and	  low	  self-­‐monitors.	  	  In	  those	  ways,	  future	  reliability	  and	  validity	  could	  be	  ensured.	  One	  additional	  variable	  to	  be	  considered	  in	  the	  future	  would	  be	  the	  role	  of	  gender	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  mood	  induction	  and	  self-­‐monitoring.	  	  The	  current	  study	  included	  a	  disproportionate	  number	  of	  females	  to	  males.	  	  Future	  studies	  should	  take	  into	  account	  the	  overall	  role	  of	  emotionality	  in	  regards	  to	  males	  and	  females	  and	  how	  that	  could	  influence	  the	  mood	  induction.	  Future	  research	  in	  the	  interaction	  of	  mood	  priming	  and	  self-­‐monitoring	  could	  include	  different	  types	  of	  induction	  for	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  monitoring.	  	  As	  priming	  is	  commonly	  used	  in	  psychology	  research,	  the	  experimenters	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  effects	  would	  be	  equal	  on	  all	  participants.	  	  Researchers	  hoping	  to	  induce	  a	  certain	  mood	  in	  their	  participants	  may	  have	  to	  consider	  the	  implications	  of	  self-­‐monitoring	  and	  the	  moderating	  effect	  that	  it	  may	  have	  on	  the	  priming.	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  1.	  	   Low	  Self	  Monitors	   High	  Self	  Monitors	   Overall	  Average	  Positive	  Condition	   21.38	   13.57	   18.26	  Negative	  Condition	   -­‐2.89	   4.40	   0.32	  Neutral	  Condition	   5.42	   6.08	   5.75	  Average	  Participant	  Mood	  Scores	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   25Appendix	  A	  Self	  Monitoring	  Scale	  (Snyder	  &	  Gangestad,	  1986)	  1. I	  find	  it	  hard	  to	  imitate	  the	  behavior	  of	  other	  people	  (F)	  2. At	  parties	  and	  social	  gatherings,	  I	  do	  not	  attempt	  to	  do	  or	  say	  things	  that	  others	  will	  like	  (F)	  3. I	  can	  only	  argue	  for	  ideas	  which	  I	  already	  believe	  (F)	  4. I	  can	  make	  impromptu	  speeches	  even	  on	  topics	  about	  which	  I	  have	  almost	  no	  information	  (T)	  5. I	  guess	  I	  put	  on	  a	  show	  to	  impress	  or	  entertain	  people	  (T)	  6. I	  would	  probably	  make	  a	  good	  actor	  (T)	  7. In	  groups	  of	  people,	  I	  am	  rarely	  the	  center	  of	  attention	  (F)	  8. In	  different	  situations	  and	  with	  different	  people,	  I	  often	  act	  like	  very	  different	  persons	  (T)	  9. I	  am	  not	  particularly	  good	  at	  making	  other	  people	  like	  me	  (F)	  10. I’m	  not	  always	  the	  person	  I	  appear	  to	  be	  (T)	  11. I	  would	  not	  change	  my	  opinions	  (or	  the	  way	  I	  do	  things)	  in	  order	  to	  please	  someone	  else	  or	  win	  their	  favor	  (F)	  12. I	  have	  considered	  being	  an	  entertainer	  (T)	  13. I	  have	  never	  been	  good	  at	  games	  like	  charades	  or	  improvisational	  acting	  (F)	  14. I	  have	  trouble	  changing	  my	  behavior	  to	  suit	  different	  people	  and	  different	  situations	  (F)	  15. At	  a	  party,	  I	  let	  others	  keep	  the	  jokes	  and	  stories	  going	  (F)	  16. I	  feel	  a	  bit	  awkward	  in	  company	  and	  do	  not	  show	  up	  quite	  as	  well	  as	  I	  should	  (F)	  17. I	  can	  look	  anyone	  in	  the	  eye	  and	  tell	  a	  lie	  with	  a	  straight	  face	  (if	  for	  a	  right	  end)	  (T)	  18. I	  may	  deceive	  people	  by	  being	  friendly	  when	  I	  really	  dislike	  them	  (T)	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  Positive	  Mood	  Inducing	  Statements	  (Velten,	  1967)	  1. Today	  is	  neither	  better	  nor	  worse	  than	  any	  other	  day	  2. I	  do	  feel	  pretty	  good	  today,	  though	  3. This	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  have	  been	  one	  of	  my	  good	  days	  4. I	  feel	  cheerful	  and	  lively	  5. My	  parents	  are	  pretty	  proud	  of	  me	  most	  of	  the	  time	  6. I’m	  glad	  I’m	  in	  college	  –	  it’s	  the	  key	  to	  success	  nowadays	  7. I’m	  pleased	  that	  most	  people	  are	  so	  friendly	  to	  me	  8. It’s	  encouraging	  that	  as	  I	  get	  further	  into	  my	  major,	  it’s	  going	  to	  take	  less	  study	  to	  get	  good	  grades	  	  9. This	  is	  one	  of	  those	  days	  when	  I	  can	  grind	  schoolwork	  with	  practically	  no	  effort	  at	  all	  	  10. If	  I	  set	  my	  mind	  to	  it,	  I	  can	  make	  things	  turn	  out	  fine	  11. I	  feel	  enthusiastic	  and	  confident	  now	  12. There	  should	  be	  opportunity	  for	  a	  lot	  of	  good	  times	  coming	  along	  13. I’m	  full	  of	  energy,	  and	  am	  really	  getting	  to	  like	  the	  things	  I’m	  doing	  on	  campus	  	  14. I’m	  able	  to	  do	  things	  accurately	  and	  efficiently	  15. I	  know	  good	  and	  well	  that	  I	  can	  achieve	  the	  goals	  I	  set	  16. I	  feel	  so	  vivacious	  and	  efficient	  today	  –	  sitting	  on	  top	  of	  the	  world	  	  17. In	  the	  long	  run,	  it’s	  obvious	  that	  things	  have	  gotten	  better	  and	  better	  during	  my	  life	  18. I	  know	  that	  in	  the	  future	  I	  won’t	  over-­‐emphasize	  so-­‐called	  “problems	  19. I’m	  feeling	  amazingly	  good	  today!	  20. I	  feel	  that	  many	  of	  my	  friendships	  will	  stick	  with	  me	  in	  the	  future	  21. I	  can	  find	  good	  in	  almost	  anything	  22. I	  feel	  highly	  perceptive	  and	  refreshed	  23. In	  a	  buoyant	  mood	  like	  this	  one,	  I	  can	  work	  fast	  and	  do	  it	  right	  the	  first	  time	  	  24. Life	  is	  so	  much	  fun;	  it	  seems	  to	  offer	  so	  many	  sources	  of	  fulfillment	  25. I	  can	  make	  decisions	  rapidly	  and	  correctly,	  and	  I	  can	  defend	  them	  against	  criticism	  easily	  26. Life	  is	  firmly	  in	  my	  control	  27. This	  is	  great	  –	  I	  really	  do	  feel	  good.	  	  I	  feel	  elated	  about	  things	  28. This	  is	  just	  one	  of	  those	  days	  when	  I’m	  ready	  to	  go!	  29. I	  feel	  like	  bursting	  with	  laughter	  –	  I	  wish	  somebody	  would	  tell	  a	  joke	  and	  give	  me	  an	  excuse!	  30. God,	  I	  feel	  great!	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  Negative	  Mood	  Inducing	  Statements	  (Velten,	  1967)	  	  1. Today	  is	  neither	  better	  nor	  worse	  than	  any	  other	  day	  2. However,	  I	  feel	  a	  little	  low	  today	  3. Every	  now	  and	  then	  I	  feel	  so	  tired	  and	  gloomy	  that	  I’d	  rather	  just	  sit	  than	  do	  anything	  4. Too	  often	  I	  have	  found	  myself	  staring	  listlessly	  into	  the	  distance,	  my	  mind	  a	  blank,	  when	  I	  definitely	  should	  have	  been	  studying	  5. It	  has	  occurred	  to	  me	  more	  than	  once	  that	  study	  is	  basically	  useless,	  because	  you	  forget	  almost	  everything	  you	  learn	  anyway	  6. I’ve	  had	  important	  decisions	  to	  make	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  I’ve	  sometimes	  made	  the	  wrong	  ones	  7. I	  do	  feel	  somewhat	  discouraged	  and	  drowsy	  –	  maybe	  I’ll	  need	  a	  nap	  when	  I	  get	  home	  8. There	  have	  been	  days	  when	  I	  felt	  weak	  and	  confused,	  and	  everything	  went	  miserably	  wrong	  9. I’ve	  had	  daydreams	  in	  which	  my	  mistakes	  keep	  occurring	  to	  me	  –	  sometimes	  I	  wish	  I	  could	  start	  over	  again	  10. I’m	  getting	  tired	  out.	  	  I	  can	  feel	  my	  body	  getting	  exhausted	  and	  heavy	  (21)	  11. At	  times	  I’ve	  been	  so	  tired	  and	  discouraged	  that	  I	  went	  to	  sleep	  rather	  than	  face	  important	  problems	  12. My	  life	  is	  so	  tiresome	  –	  the	  same	  old	  thing	  day	  after	  day	  depresses	  me	  (24)	  13. I	  want	  to	  go	  to	  sleep	  –	  I	  feel	  like	  just	  closing	  my	  eyes	  and	  going	  to	  sleep	  right	  here	  14. I’m	  not	  very	  alert;	  I	  feel	  listless	  and	  vaguely	  sad	  15. I’ve	  doubted	  that	  I’m	  not	  a	  worthwhile	  person	  	  16. It	  often	  seems	  that	  no	  matter	  how	  hard	  I	  try,	  things	  still	  go	  wrong	  	  17. I’ve	  noticed	  that	  no	  one	  seems	  to	  really	  understand	  or	  care	  when	  I	  complain	  or	  feel	  unhappy	  about	  myself	  	  18. I’m	  uncertain	  about	  my	  future	  19. Things	  are	  worse	  now	  than	  when	  I	  was	  younger	  	  20. I	  feel	  tired	  and	  depressed;	  I	  don’t	  feel	  like	  working	  on	  the	  things	  I	  know	  I	  must	  get	  done	  21. I	  feel	  horribly	  guilty	  about	  how	  I’ve	  treated	  my	  parents	  at	  time	  22. Things	  are	  easier	  and	  better	  for	  other	  people	  than	  for	  me	  	  23. It’s	  so	  discouraging	  the	  way	  people	  don’t	  really	  listen	  to	  me	  	  24. I’ve	  felt	  so	  alone	  before,	  that	  I	  could	  have	  cried	  25. My	  thoughts	  are	  so	  slow	  and	  downcast	  I	  don’t	  want	  to	  think	  or	  talk	  26. Life	  seems	  too	  much	  for	  me	  anyhow	  –	  my	  efforts	  are	  wasted	  27. I	  have	  too	  many	  bad	  things	  in	  my	  life	  28. I	  don’t	  want	  to	  do	  anything	  	  29. All	  the	  unhappiness	  of	  my	  past	  life	  is	  taking	  possession	  of	  me	  30. I	  want	  to	  go	  to	  sleep	  and	  never	  wake	  up	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  D	  	  Neutral	  Mood	  Priming	  Statements	  (Velten,	  1967)	  	  1. Japan	  was	  elected	  to	  the	  United	  Nations	  almost	  fourteen	  years	  after	  Pearl	  Harbor	  2. We	  have	  two	  kinds	  of	  nouns	  denoting	  physical	  things:	  individual	  and	  mass	  nouns	  3. Saturn	  is	  sometimes	  in	  conjunction,	  beyond	  the	  sun	  from	  the	  earth,	  and	  is	  not	  visible	  4. Some	  streets	  were	  still	  said	  to	  be	  listed	  under	  their	  old	  names	  5. There	  is	  a	  large	  rose	  growing	  near	  Tyer,	  Texas	  6. Many	  states	  supply	  milk	  for	  grammar	  school	  children	  	  7. The	  machine	  dominated	  county	  posts	  for	  as	  long	  as	  anyone	  could	  remember	  	  8. The	  Orient	  Express	  travels	  between	  Paris	  and	  Istanbul	  9. When	  the	  Banyan	  bent	  down	  under	  it’s	  own	  weight,	  its	  branches	  began	  to	  take	  root	  10. The	  Hope	  Diamond	  was	  shipped	  from	  South	  Africa	  to	  London	  through	  the	  regular	  mail	  service	  11. The	  ship	  was	  ancient,	  and	  would	  soon	  be	  retired	  from	  the	  fleet	  12. Slang	  is	  a	  constantly	  changing	  part	  of	  the	  language	  13. There	  are	  some	  forms	  in	  which	  no	  oath	  is	  required	  14. Intramatics	  finds	  mates	  for	  the	  lonely	  15. 99.1%	  of	  Alaska	  is	  owned	  by	  the	  Federal	  government	  16. Two	  men	  dressed	  as	  repairmen	  will	  appear	  shortly	  after	  the	  van	  pulls	  up	  17. The	  wood	  was	  discolored	  as	  if	  it	  had	  been	  held	  in	  a	  fire	  18. A	  light	  was	  noticed	  in	  the	  dark	  outside,	  and	  it	  moved	  eerily	  towards	  the	  house	  19. Provoked	  arousal	  and	  orientation	  are	  accompanied	  by	  steeper	  negative	  shifts	  	  20. The	  names	  on	  the	  Christmas	  mailing	  list	  are	  alphabetically	  ordered	  21. Significantly,	  these	  changes	  occur	  during	  the	  full	  moon	  	  22. The	  map	  would	  prove	  useless	  as	  a	  beginning	  guide	  	  23. 	  Black	  and	  white	  pictures	  are	  arranged	  in	  ten	  sections	  24. The	  notice	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  coffee	  breaks	  were	  being	  limited	  25. The	  doorkeeper	  was	  dressed	  in	  red	  26. The	  organization	  depended	  on	  the	  people	  for	  support	  27. It	  was	  their	  sixth	  consecutive	  best	  seller	  28. The	  merger	  did	  not	  change	  the	  company’s	  policy	  29. Utah	  is	  the	  beehive	  state	  30. A	  free	  sample	  will	  be	  given	  to	  each	  person	  who	  enters	  the	  store	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  E	  Emotion	  Words	  (Watson	  &	  Clark,	  1988)	  Interested	  (+)	  	   	   	   	   	   Irritable	  (-­‐)	  Distressed	  (-­‐)	  	   	   	   	   	   Alert	  (+)	  Excited	  (+)	   	   	   	   	   	   Ashamed	  (-­‐)	  Upset	  (-­‐)	   	   	   	   	   	   Inspired	  (+)	  Strong	  	  (+)	   	   	   	   	   	   Nervous	  (-­‐)	  Guilty	  (-­‐)	   	   	   	   	   	   Determined	  (+)	  Scared	  	  (-­‐)	   	   	   	   	   	   Attentive	  (+)	  Hostile	  (-­‐)	   	   	   	   	   	   Jittery	  (-­‐)	  Enthusiastic	  (+)	   	   	   	   	   Active	  (+)	  Proud	  (+)	   	   	   	   	   	   Afraid	  (-­‐)	  	  
